APALLS: A Secure MANET Routing Protocol by Sivakumar Kulasekaran & Mahalingam Ramkumar
Selection of our books indexed in the Book Citation Index 
in Web of Science™ Core Collection (BKCI)
Interested in publishing with us? 
Contact book.department@intechopen.com
Numbers displayed above are based on latest data collected. 
For more information visit www.intechopen.com
Open access books available
Countries delivered to Contributors from top 500 universities
International  authors and editors
Our authors are among the
most cited scientists
Downloads
We are IntechOpen,
the world’s leading publisher of
Open Access books
Built by scientists, for scientists
12.2%
122,000 135M
TOP 1%154
4,800
0APALLS: A Secure MANET Routing Protocol
Sivakumar Kulasekaran and Mahalingam Ramkumar
Mississippi State University
USA
1. Introduction
In infra-structured networks dedicated routers relay packets between network hosts.
In contrast, in mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) nodes are simultaneously network
hosts and routers. Due to their reduced dependence on communication infrastructure
MANETs have useful applications in scenarios where it may be impractical to set up
expensive communication infrastructure, and in scenarios involving failure of communication
infrastructure.
MANET routing protocols are rules to be followed by every mobile node to cooperatively
discover optimal paths and route packets between end-points (source and destination nodes).
In this chapter we restrict ourselves to the dynamic source routing (DSR) protocol (Johnson
& Maltz, 1996). In DSR paths between end-points are established by flooding route-request
(RREQ) packets originating from the source, in response to which route-response (RREP)
packets are sent along the reverse path. The original DSR protocol (Johnson & Maltz, 1996)
implicitly assumes that all nodes will abide by the rules. The presence of nodes that do not
adhere to the rules, either deliberately, or due to malfunctioning, can have a deleterious effect
on the MANET subnet. Secure MANET routing protocols strive to improve the reliability of
the routing process under the presence of non cooperative nodes.
1.1 Securing DSR
Non confirming nodes can inflict a wide variety of passive and active attacks on DSR. Two
basic tools employed to thwart attacks are i) mandating cryptographic authentication; and
ii) monitoring neighbors to estimate their trustworthiness. A mechanism for cryptographic
authentication is also a prerequisite for monitoring. Bootstrapping cryptographic
authentication mechanisms mandates an authority trusted by all nodes.
1.1.1 Role of the trusted authority
The trusted authority (TA) provides secrets to nodes, thereby conferring upon them the
eligibility to take part in ad hoc subnets. The TA may also revoke the privileges of some nodes,
by disseminating revocation lists. The network size N is the total number of nodes afforded the
privilege of participating in MANET subnets. Any random subset of the N eligible nodes, say
Ns nodes (which may accidentally be in the same geographical region), can form a connected
ad hoc subnet.
For retaining the most compelling advantage of MANETs (their reduced infrastructural
support) it is desirable that the TA is off-line. In other words, subnets disconnected from the
TA, or any other form of infrastructural support, should still be able to carry out their tasks.
10
www.intechopen.com
2 Theory and Applications of Ad Hoc Networks
In (Sanzgiri et al., 2002) such MANET networks, where the infrastructural support is required
only for predistribution of keys, are referred to as managed open networks.
1.1.2 Resisting attacks
Active attacks involve modifying routing packets in ways that violate the prescribed
protocol. For resisting active attackers secure routing protocols will require features to
detect inconsistencies in routing information resulting from active attacks, identify perpetrators
responsible for such inconsistencies, and have mechanisms in place to limit the role of such
nodes. Effective strategies are also required to deter active attacks in the first place. For
example, the ability to obtain non repudiable proof of active attacks can be an effective
deterrent. Such proofs can be submitted to the TA and lead to revocation of such nodes.
Passive attackers may attempt to eavesdrop on messages exchanged between end-points
or take selective part in routing. Submitting non-repudiable proof may not be possible1
for passive attacks involving selective participation. Nevertheless, effective strategies are
required to promote self-less participation.
Several secure routing protocols (Abusalah et al., 2008) have been proposed in the literature.
Some focus on cryptographic authentication (Hu et al., 2005)-(Capkun and Hubaux., 2003),
taking into consideration the resource constraints inherent to battery operated mobile devices.
Some have suggested strategies like listening in the promiscuous mode (Marti et al.,
2000)-(Marshall et .al, 2003), unambiguously identifying misbehaving nodes (Burmester et al.,
2003)- (Awebuch et al., 2002), assigning trust metrics to nodes, and employing such metrics to
advantageously influence the routing process.
1.2 Contributions
The contribution of this chapter is APALLS, a secure routing protocol based on DSR. Some of
the shortcomings of current protocols that are addressed by APALLS are as follows:
1. Non-repudiable authentication, while necessary, is not sufficient for obtaining
non-repudiable proof of misbehavior. While the importance of non repudiable
authentication is well understood (Sanzgiri et al., 2002),(Sun et al., 2007), investigation of
issues in obtaining non repudiable proof of misbehavior (in the context of adhering to a
MANET routing protocol) has not received attention thus far. To our knowledge, APALLS
is the first protocol which addresses this issue.
2. Protocols that focus on monitoring strategies (Marti et al., 2000)-(Marshall et .al, 2003)
have predominantly ignored the relevance of cryptographic authentication. Likewise,
protocols that focus on cryptographic authentication ignore strategies for monitoring.
Comprehensive routing protocols should productively employ both.
3. While many key distribution strategies have been proposed for ad hoc networks, they have
not considered realistic network models. The choice of schemes in APALLS are driven by
realistic models for large scale MANET deployments.
APALLS2 borrows some features from Ariadne (Hu et al., 2005), a popular secure extension of
DSR. Ariadne does not prescribe strategies for monitoring, and consequently, does not possess
mechanisms to address passive attacks involving selective participation. The cryptographic
authentication strategies in Ariadne permit the source or destination to detect inconsistencies
1While a packet signed by a node B can be used by A to demonstrate that B violated the protocol, it is
arguably infeasible for a node A prove to some third party that B did not forward a RREQ/RREP.
2Ariadne with Pairwise Authentication and Link Layer Signatures.
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in path advertisements in (RREQ or RREP packets) resulting from active attacks. However,
Ariadne does not attempt to identify the reason for the observed inconsistency, namely, the
perpetrator responsible for the inconsistency. An implication of the fact that perpetrators
remain unidentified is that an attacker faces no risk in carrying out (several types of) active
attacks. Such attacks, which can reduce the efficacy of the path discovery mechanism, can be
carried out repeatedly due to lack of deterrents.
APALLS provides a severe deterrent for active attacks, the threat of revocation from the
network, as non repudiable proof can be submitted to the off-line TA. APALLS also recognizes
that the process of revocation, involving submission of verifiable proof to the TA (when ever
the node submitting the proof has access to the TA), followed by network wide dissemination
of revocation lists by the TA, will not yield immediate relief from the active attacker(s) in ad
hoc subnets. For this purpose, APALLS includes features to route around nodes suspected
of misbehaving. APALLS also includes elements to keep an effective watch on neighbors
to address passive attacks involving selective participation. Nevertheless, due to careful
choice of cryptographic primitives, APALLS incorporates all these features without placing
unreasonable demands on the capabilities of nodes.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide an overview of DSR
and Ariadne. In Section 3 we outline a generic managed-open MANET model consisting of
an off-line trusted authority (TA). The threat model and the intended goals of APALLS are
enumerated in Section 3.1. This is followed by a description of mechanisms for bootstrapping
trust relationships between nodes of the network.
Section 4 provides the description of the APALLS protocol. The security analysis of APALLS,
including rationale for the choices made, are described in Section 5. A discussion of related
work can be found in Sections 6.1 and 6.2. Conclusions are offered in Section 6.3.
The following notations are used in this chapter
1. A, B,C · · · (upper case alphabets) represent unique identities of nodes;
2. ΣA = 〈M〉A - digital signature of A for a message M.
3. h() - a cryptographic second pre-image resistant hash function (not necessarily colission
resistant);
4. h(M,K) - hashed message authentication code (HMAC) for a message M based on a key K.
5. C = K[P] encryption of a plain-text3 P using a key K and some block cipher like AES/DES;
6. P = K−1[C] decryption of cipher-text C using key K.
7. K0A · · ·K
L−1
A - hash-chain of length L with commitment K
L
A, where K
i
A = h(K
i−1
A ),1 ≤ i ≤ L.
2. Background
Dynamic source routing (DSR) is an on-demand protocol where a node S desiring to find a
path to a node T broadcasts a route-request (RREQ) packet indicating the source S, sequence
number q, destination T, and a hop-limit nh. RREQ packets are flooded. In general, every
node in the same connected subnet will receive one RREQ (with the same source and sequence
number) from each neighbor, but will rebroadcast only one (usually the first RREQ received).
Every node rebroadcasting an RREQ inserts its identity.
3If the plain-text P is larger than the block size it is assumed that some appropriate mode of operation
like cipher-block-chaining (CBC) is used, and the initial value is prepended to the cipher-text C.
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For an RREQ from a source S, intended for a destination T, traversing a path (A, B,C, . . .)
QS(q,S) = Q(q,S) = [S,q, T,nh]
QA(q,S) = [Q
S
(q,S), (A)]
QB(q,S) = [Q
S
(q,S), (A, B)] = [Q
A
(q,S), (B)]
QC(q,S) = [Q
S
(q,S), (A, B,C)] = [Q
B
(q,S), (C)],
... (1)
where the QX
(q,S)
represents all RREQ fields relayed by a node X, and received by the
destination.
When the RREQ packet reaches the destination4, it contains the fields Q(q,S) specified by the
source, and the list of all nodes in the path traversed by the RREQ. The destination sends
a route-response (RREP) packet along the reverse path. The source and destination may in
general discover multiple paths as the destination can receive one RREQ from every neighbor.
2.1 Attacks on DSR
Attacks on DSR can be broadly classified into passive, semi-active, and active attacks. Passive
attackers may perform eavesdropping on application data packets exchanged between nodes,
or take selective part in the network. Semi-active attackers may act as invisible relays to create
misrepresentations of the network topology. Such an attacker positioned between two nodes
A and B (who are out of each other’s range) may simply echo packets broadcast by A such
that B can receive such packets. However by echoing RREQ packets and not echoing RREP
packets, the attacker can cause the route discovery to fail. Interconnected invisible relays that
are physically well separated can create worm-holes (Hu et al., 2001) to misrepresent the subnet
topology. By periodically turning on and off such worm-holes they can create rapid changes
to the perceived topology, thereby inflicting significant bandwidth overhead.
Active attackers intentionally modify routing packets in violation of the protocol - for
example, by inserting nonexistent nodes in the path, or deleting nodes that are actually in
the path, or modifying the values inserted in the RREQ by the source and/or other upstream
nodes. DSR is also susceptible to rushing attacks (Hu et al., 2003) which result from the ability
of an attacker to forward RREQ packets with the intent of either creating sub-optimal routes,
or even causing complete failure of the route establishment process. As each node forwards
only one RREQ packet, a rushed bad packet can preempt other good packets.
Two basic tools employed to thwart attacks attacks are i) mandating cryptographic
authentication; and ii) monitoring neighbors to estimate their trustworthiness. As an
important pre-requisite for monitoring is the need to know who is being monitored5,
cryptographic authentication is necessary for the ability to monitor.
2.2 Cryptographic authentication
Facilitating cryptographic authentication schemes requires a trusted authority (TA) who
conveys secrets to every node and/or public values associated with every node to every
4While in the original DSR even intermediate nodes with the knowledge of a path to the destination
can invoke an RREP, in most secure DSR extensions only the destination is allowed to do so.
5A node A observing the behavior of a neighbor claiming-to-be-B should be able to ascertain that the
observed node is indeed B before A can make any inferences about the B’s trustworthiness.
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node in the network. Such values provided by the TA are necessary for computing verifiable
cryptographic authentication tokens. As packets without verifiable cryptographic authentication
will be ignored, the TA confers the eligibility for nodes to take part in MANET subnets.
Cryptographic authentication can be classified into mutual (or one-to-one) authentication and
broadcast (one-to-many) authentication. A secret KAB known only to A and B can be used
by A and B for computing and verifying pairwise authentication tokens. For a mesage M
the token is typically a hashed message authentication code (HMAC) TAB(M) = h(M,KAB).
Schemes for pairwise authentication thus rely on key distribution schemes that facilitate
pairwise secrets between all node-pairs.
An one-to-many authentication token TA(M) = (RA, M) for a message M can be created only
by a node with access to a secret key RA. The token can be verified using a public counterpart
UA of the secret RA. The verification function fver(M, TAM,UA) provides a binary output
(pass or fail). If the verification test passes, the verifier can conclude that only an entity with
the private counterpart of UA could have computed the token TA(M). In addition, if it is
possible for the verifier to establish that the public value UA is indeed associated with a node
A, the verifier can conclude that the token was created by A. Facilitating such schemes calls
for the TA to distribute authentic public values associated with every node to every node.
2.2.1 MANET layers
In the context of DSR, “application layer” cryptographic mechanisms are required for
end-points to protect the privacy and integrity of data exchanged between them. “Link
layer” mechanisms are required for authentication of neighboring nodes. “Network layer”
mechanisms are required for authentication of intermediate nodes that take part in relaying
packets between end-points.
How end-points choose to protect application data should be left to the end-points themselves;
ideally, such strategies should not not be under the control of the TA. However, strategies for
link layer and network layer authentication should be promulgated by the TA.
2.3 Ariadne
In Ariadne the end-points share an application layer secret. The authentication strategies
facilitated by the TA include i) a sequence-number hash chain to limit the number of RREQs
that can be sent by any node; ii) TESLA broadcast authentication (Perrig et al., 2001) for
authentication of intermediate nodes by an end-point; and iii) a network-wide secret at the
link layer to deny access to external nodes.
In the sequence-number hash chain of a node A, SA = {R
0
A, R
1
A, . . . , R
nr
A }, R
i
A = h(R
i−1
A ) for 1≤
i ≤ nr, and the commitment R
nr
A is made known to every node by the TA. Along with an RREQ
with sequence number q initiated by A the value R
nr−q
A is released from its sequence-number
hash chain.
In the TESLA hash chain of A, HAt0,∆ = {K
0
A,K
1
A, . . . , K
L−1
A ,K
A
L } with commitment K
A
L , ∆ is a
time-interval (for example, 1 second), and t0 is an absolute value of time (for example, Dec 1,
2009, 0200:00, GMT). The parameters associated with A’s chain (commitment KAL , ∆ and t0)
are made known to all nodes by the TA. This TESLA chain can be used by A only for a limited
segment of time (between t0 and t0 + (L − 1)∆).
A is expected to keep the key KL−iA in its chain private at least till time ti = t0 + i∆. This key
can be used for authenticating a value M by appending a HMAC h(M,KL−iA ), provided the
HMAC reaches potential verifiers before time ti. Once K
L−i
A is made public (after time ti) the
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verifier can i) verify the TESLA HMAC; and (if consistent) ii) repeatedly hash KL−iA (i times)
and verify that the result is indeed KAL . The verifier can then conclude that the HMAC was
computed by A (as only A had access to the value KL−iA at time ti).
2.3.1 RREQ and RREP
The steps involved in RREQ propagation from a source S to a destination T through a path
(A, B,C, . . .) are depicted in Table 1 (left column). K¯ST is the application layer shared by the
end-points. The RREQ fields QS
(q,S)
specified by the source includes a time ti before which
the destination should receive the RREQ, and a value R
nr−q
S from S’s sequence number chain.
Intermediate nodes and the destination will process the RREQ only if i) (S,q) is fresh (the node
had not previously seen an RREQ from S with a sequence number q or higher); ii) hashing
R
nr−q
S q-times yields the commitment R
nr
S of S; and iii) the RREQ is received before time ti.
Apart from the fields QS
(q,S)
which are carried forward all the way to the destination, the
source S broadcasts a value βS which is intended only for neighbors. The value βS is chosen
such that the destination T (which shares the secret K¯ST with the source) can also compute βS.
A node A downstream of S appends two values before rebroadcasting the RREQ as QA
(q,S)
=
[QS
(q,S)
, (A, MA)], where MA is a TESLA HMAC computed using a value from A’s TESLA
chain which will remain A’s secret till time ti. In addition, a per-hop hash value βA =
h(βS, A) is also broadcast by A. Similarly, a node B downstream of A broadcasts Q
B
(q,S)
=
[QA
(q,S)
, (B, MB)] and βB = h(βA, B). Unlike TESLA HMACs, the per-hop hashes are not
carried forward (they are intended only for neighbors).
The destination T computes βS (as computed by the source) and verifies that the per-hop
hash submitted by the last node in the path is consistent with the list of nodes in the path. The
per-hop hash is intended to prevent node deletion attacks. Without this, a node C can simply
remove the values (B, MB) in the RREQ, and thus illegally delete B from the path. With the
per-hop hash, to trick the destination into accepting a path (A,C, . . .) as valid, C will need
access to the per-hop hash βA which is privy only to neighbors of A (and C is not one). The
destination will invoke an RREP only if the per-hop hash is consistent. The RREP includes all
fields of the RREQ packet and is authenticated to the source using a HMAC (based on secret
K¯ST).
After time ti, the destination relays the RREP along the reverse path. Every node releases
the value from the TESLA chain used for computing the TESLA HMACs during the forward
path. At the end of the reverse path the source i) verifies the TESLA HMACs, and that ii) the
TESLA keys are consistent with the time ti and their respective commitments. Mandating
authenication prevents illegal node insertions. In Ariadne node deletion attacks can be
detected by the destination at the end of the forward path; node insertion attacks can be
detected at the end of the reverse path, by the RREQ source.
3. APALLS: application model and goals
As an application of MANETs consider a (fictitious) network operator, Tingular, who desires to
provide subscribers with a wide variety of services with minimal investment in infrastructure.
Tingular subscribers can find other Tingular subscribers within range and form multi-hop
MANET subnets. Nodes (Tingular subscribers) in a connected subnet can exchange messages
with each other. Apart from communicating with other nodes in the subnet, any node with
226 Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks: Applications
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wide-area connectivity (for example, access to the Internet) can act as a gateway and extend
Internet access to all other nodes in the subnet.
The total number of Tingular subscribers at any time t, say N(t), can be of the order of several
millions (and varies with time t as new subscribers may join, and some may leave the Tingular
network). Any small subset of current subscribers who happen to be in a geographical region
like a mall, or an airport, can come-together to form a Tingular subnet (a small subnet may
have just two nodes). Several Tingular subnets may operate simultaneously at different
locations. While some subnets may have one or more nodes with wide-area network access,
some may be completely isolated from the rest of the world. Tingular subnets will thus
be able to function even during periods of natural disasters, when other communication
infrastructure fail.
The main tasks to be performed by Tingular for managing the network are
1. to specify rules (the secure routing protocol) to be followed (a one-time process);
2. induct subscribers into the Tingular network, by providing them with secrets, possibly in
exchange for a small subscription fee (performed once for every node inducted into the
Tingular network); and
3. (periodically) revoke subscribers who violate rules, or do not renew their subscriptions.
Inducting a subscriber can be as simple as providing a SIM card (subscriber identity module)
to the subscriber, preloaded with the secrets necessary for the node to communicate with other
Tingular subscribers, and thus take part in any Tingular subnet. A “Tingular node” can be any
WiFi enabled general-purpose computer (hand-held, laptop or desktop) which can house the
SIM card, and can run Tingular software (which dictates the rules to be followed by Tingular
nodes). Revoking nodes can be through periodic dissemination of revocation lists (posted in
Tingular’s website). Due to the modest investment required, Tingular can afford to provide
useful services for a low subscription fee.
3.1 Threat model and goals
Some Tingular nodes in a subnet may engage in active attacks. Some such attacks may result
from mere malfunctioning of nodes. Some may be perpetrated by Tingular nodes under the
control of attackers. One goal of APALLS is to obtain non repudiable proof of active attacks.
Such proofs can be submitted to the TA at a convenient time (as access to the TA may not be
available from some ad hoc subnets), perhaps leading to revocation of such nodes from the
Tingular network.
The revocation process will involve i) submission of proof to the TA, ii) verification of such
proofs by the TA, and iii) dissemination of revocation lists by the TA. While the threat of
revocation can be an effective deterrent, the process of revocation may not provide immediate
relief from attackers in the subnet. For this purpose, APALLS will include explicit features to
improve the chance of finding paths free of suspected active attackers.
Passive attacks include acts like not forwarding RREQ packets, not accepting RREP or data
packets, etc. Selfish subscribers may not desire to take part in the subnet unless they require to
communicate with another node. There may also exist other external attackers (who may not
be Tingular nodes) performing semi-active attacks. While obtaining non repudiable proof of
misbehavior is not possible for passive and semi-active attacks, APALLS aims to have tangible
measures for promoting self-less behavior, and “living with” semi-active attackers.
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3.2 Key distribution for APALLS
The operator of the Tingular network employs a web-server, with a certified trustworthy
computer (for example, a cryptographic co-processor) at the back end. The trustworthy
module is the TA. Tingular also possesses a facility for securely preloading SIM cards with
secrets provided by the TA.
The TA i) generates an asymmetric key pair (RTA,UTA); and ii) chooses a master secret µ.
Potential subscribers create a Tingular user account. On payment of the subscription fee
subscribers receive a Tingular SIM card with some secrets.
The identity A assigned to a subscriber is of the form A = [QA ‖ A
′] where QA is a serial
number, and A′ may be the user name. The node A is also issued an asymmetric key pair
(RA,UA), and a certificate CA = E(RTA, A ‖ UA ‖ Te), where Te is time of expiry of CA. The
certificate can be decrypted any any node with access to the public key UTA as [A ‖UA ‖ Te] =
D(UTA,CA). The specifics of the functions E() and D() depend on the type of asymmetric
primitive employed.
The subscriber sequence number is issued in a chronological order. The sequence number for
the first subscriber is 1. A node A with (say) QA = 1,000,000 is the millionth subscriber. The
values included in the SIM card provided to A are
1. a secret KA = h(µ, A);
2. the private key RA;
3. the public key of the TA, UTA; and
4. the certificate CA.
In addition, A receives QA − 1 public values of the form
PAX = h(KA, X)⊕ h(KX , A),∀X = [QX ‖ X
′]|QX < QA,
where a specific X = [QX ‖ X
′] represents the identity assigned to a subscriber inducted before
A (or QX < QA). The public values could be downloaded from Tingular web site or mailed
by Tingular (in a flash card / optical disc) over the postal network. The millionth subscriber
A will receive 999,999 such public values.
The shared secret KAB between two subscribers A = QA ‖ A
′ and B = QB ‖ B
′ is computed as
follows. If QA < QB then B has access to the public value PAB (and A does not). The secret
KAB is computed as
KAB =
{
h(KA, B) by A
h(KB, A)⊕ PAB by B
(2)
The scheme described above for facilitating pairwise secrets is based on the modified
Leighton-Micali scheme (MLS) (Ramkumar , 2008). If the public values (and consequently,
the pairwise secrets) are 80 bits long, the ten-millionth subscriber will require about 100 MB
of storage (perhaps in a flash card plugged into the hand-held computer). The maximum
network size is not a hard limit. Newer subscribers (with larger sequence numbers) will just
need more storage for public values.
If unlimited network sizes are desired, scalable KPSs are viable options (see Appendix 8.1).
4. The APALLS protocol
Any subscriber, after receiving the secrets and the required public values, can take part in any
ad hoc subnet created by any subset of Tingular subscribers.
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4.1 Joining a subnet
A subscriber A sends a probe [A, c] (where c is a randomly chosen challenge) to determine
other subscribers within range. A node B in the neighborhood responds with [B, A,KBA(c)]. In
general, the node A may receive one response from every neighbor within the reliable delivery
neighborhood6 (RDN) of A. Let us assume that A receives responses from 3 nodes X,Y
and Z in its RDN. Node A then chooses a random one-hop group secret GA and broadcasts
individual encryptions of the secret as [X,Y, Z,KAX(GA),KAY(GA),KAZ(GA)] to its neighbors.
In response, A’s neighbors X,Y, Z are expected to send their respective one-hop group secrets
(GX , GY , GZ) to A.
Every packet sent/relayed by a node A is encrypted with the secret GA. In other words, every
node enforces a private logical neighborhood (PLN) (Sivakumar and Ramkumar, 2008). The PLN
of a node A is (in general) a subset of nodes in the RDN of A. Node A explicitly invites some
nodes into its PLN by providing a secret GA individually to each node. If a node A, with
nodes X, Y and Z in its PLN, suspects X of i) violating the protocol, or ii) acting in a selfish
manner, or iii) suspect a semi-active attacker between A and X, then A can simply cut-off X
from its PLN by providing a new secret to Y and Z (and withholding the secret from X). In a
scenario where A has provided its PLN secret GA to node X, but X did not send its PLN secret
GX to node A (or X did not accept A into its PLN), node A will eject X from its PLN during
the next broadcast by A - which is encrypted using a new PLN secret GA
′, and the secret GA
′
conveyed only to nodes that A desires to retain in its PLN (and possibly other nodes that A
desires to induct into its PLN). Thus, the PLN secret of A is updated whenever a node leaves
the PLN (or is ejected by A from its PLN).
Every transmission by A is monitored by all nodes in the PLN of A, and checked for
consistency with the protocol. Nodes that are observed to violate rules face the risk of being
ejected from the PLN of the observer. Every node also maintains a revocation list periodically
disseminated by the network operator. The revocation list can be a list of sequence numbers,
signed using the TA’s private key. Nodes are expected check their revocation lists before
accepting a node into their PLNs. Nodes also broadcast their public key certificates to their
PLN neighbors. The certificates are decrypted, and the authenticated public key of neighbors
are cached.
4.2 RREQ propagation in APALLS
Table I depicts the sequence of operations involved in RREQ propagation from a source S to a
destination T, through a path (A, B,C, . . .). To facilitate comparison with Ariadne the sequence
of operations performed in Ariadne are also shown in the left column of Table I.
4.2.1 RREQ source S
The RREQ QS
(q,S)
from source S specifies a maximum hop-count nh. The RREQ can
(optionally) include a list of nodes (BL) black-listed by the RREQ source. The RREQ QS
(q,S)
includes the digital signature ΣS of the source. In addition, the broadcast by S includes a
per-hop hash βS (as in Ariadne) intended only for nodes in the PLN; In Table I values which
are not carried forward (and intended only for nodes in the PLN) are shown enclosed in
flowered braces.
6The RDN of A includes all nodes with which A has confirmed that bi-directional links exist.
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The PLN secret is used for encrypting all transmissions to neighbors. Every transmission by
a node X is prepended7 with the identity X of the node (in the clear) to enable the receiver to
determine that the secret GX should be used for decrypting the packet.
4.2.2 Intermediate nodes
Intermediate nodes verify the signature of the RREQ source. The public key certificate CS
required for verification of the signature ΣS of the source can be included in the first RREQ
sent by S in the subnet. Certificates are cached by other nodes in the subnet. If a node reviving
the RREQ from S does not have access to CS, it requests the upstream node to provide the
certificate. Nodes will not rebroadcast the RREQ until they gain access to the public key of the
source. If an intermediate node is included in the list BL, it simply ignores then RREQ. If an
intermediate node receives an RREQ forwarded by a node in the list, the RREQ is ignored.
A neighbor A downstream of S decrypts the broadcast from S (using the PLN secret GS
provided by S) and verifies the signature ΣS. Every intermediate node appends three values
that are carried forward all the way to the destination. The fieldsQA
(q,S)
broadcast by A include
the triple (A, MA,ν
S
A). MA is a HMAC for the destination T computed using the secret KAT .
The value νSA = KAT [βS] (which is not present in Ariadne) is the “encrypted upstream per-hop
hash” (Sivakumar and Ramkumar, 2008).
Intermediate nodes also append 4 values which are intended only for nodes in the PLN. The
4 values broadcast by a node C are i) the per-hop hash βC (as in Ariadne); ii) hash of the
signature of the previous hop B - or σB = h(ΣB); iii) a value vB, which is a one-way function
of signatures appended by all nodes upstream of B; and iv) the signature ΣC, computed over
the values QC
(q,S)
, vc = h(vB,σB), and βC. For the first node in the path (A) the values σ, and
v are not required. For notational consistency values that are not required are indicated as
NULL. For nodes like B that are in the PLN of the A, the value vA is NULL (as there is no
intermediate node upstream of A).
In both Ariadne and APALLS (and more generally, any DSR-based protocol) a node with k
neighbors will receive k RREQs (one from each neighbor) with the same source and sequence
number. In Ariadne an intermediate nodes needs to store only one RREQ (corresponding to
which an RREQ was relayed by the node), for a small duration, within which it is reasonable
to expect an RREP. In APALLS an intermediate node with k neighbors will need to verify k + 1
signatures for every RREQ (with the same source and sequence number): i) the signature of
the RREQ source and ii) the signature appended by k neighbors. All k RREQs (along with the
4 one hop values) are cached for a small duration. Each node broadcasts one signed RREQ.
While the signature of the RREQ source is verified by all nodes, signatures of intermediate
nodes are verified only by PLN neighbors.
4.3 Route response
In Ariadne if any inconsistency is detected the destination simply drops the RREQ. In APALLS
the destination takes some proactive steps to isolate the problem.
The destination computes βS = h(Q(q,S),KST) in the same manner computed by the RREQ
source. The destination then proceeds to check the self-consistency and consistency of every
node in the path. The values appended by an intermediate node C, viz., MC and ν
B
C are
deemed self-consistent by the destination T if
MC = h(Q
B
(q,S), (C,ν
B
C), h(K
−1
CT [ν
B
C ],C),KCT). (3)
7This is not shown in Table 1 to reduce notational complexity.
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At Node S
Q(q,S) = [S,q, T, ti ] Q(q,S) = [S, t, T,nh, 〈BL〉]
βS = h(Q
S
(q,S)
, K¯ST) βS = h(Q(q,S),KST),u = h(βS)
ΣS = 〈Q(q,S),u〉S
QS
(q,S)
= [Q(q,S), R
nr−q
S ] Q
S
(q,S)
= [Q(q,S),u,ΣS]
S → ∗ KU [Q
S
(q,S)
,{βS}] GS[Q
S
(q,S)
,{βS}]
At Node A
βA = h(βS, A) βA = h(βS, A)
νSA = KAT(βS)
MA = h(Q
S
(q,S)
,βA,K
L−i
A ) MA = h(Q
S
(q,S)
,νSA,βA,KAT)
QA(q,S) = [Q
S
(q,S)
, (A, MA)] Q
A
(q,S) = [Q
S
(q,S)
, (A,νSA, MA)]
ΣA = 〈Q
A
(q,S),βA〉A
A → ∗ KU [Q
A
(q,S),{βA}] GA[Q
A
(q,S),{βA,ΣA, NULL, NULL}]
At Node B
βB = h(βA, B) βB = h(βA, B)
νAB = KBT(βA)
MB = h(Q
A
(q,S),βB,K
L−i
B ) MB = h(Q
A
(q,S),ν
A
B ,βB,KBT)
QB(q,S) = [Q
A
(q,S), (B, MB)] Q
B
(q,S) = [Q
A
(q,S), (B,ν
A
B , MB)]
σA = h(ΣA),vB = h(σA, NULL)
ΣB = 〈vB,Q
B
(q,S),βB〉B
B → ∗ KU [Q
B
(q,S),{βB}] GB[Q
B
(q,S),{βB,ΣB,σA, NULL}]
At Node C
βC = h(βB,C) βC = h(βB,C)
νBC = KCT(βB)
MC = h(Q
B
(q,S),βC ,K
L−i
C ) MC = h(Q
B
(q,S),ν
B
C ,βC ,KCT)
QC
(q,S)
= [QB(q,S), (C, MC)] Q
C
(q,S)
= [QB(q,S), (C,ν
B
C , MC)]
σB = h(ΣB),vC = h(σB,vB)
ΣC = 〈vC ,Q
C
(q,S)
,βC〉C
C → ∗ KU [Q
C
(q,S)
,{βC}] GC [Q
C
(q,S)
,{βC ,ΣC ,σB,vB}]
At Node D
βD = h(βC , D) βD = h(βC , D)
νCD = KCT(βC)
MD = h(Q
C
(q,S)
,βD ,K
L−i
D ) MD = h(Q
C
(q,S)
,νCD ,βD ,KDT)
QD(q,S) = [Q
C
(q,S)
, (D, MD)] Q
D
(q,S) = [Q
C
(q,S)
, (D,νCD , MD)]
σc = h(ΣC),vD = h(σc,vC)
ΣD = 〈vD ,Q
D
(q,S),βD〉D
D → ∗ KU [Q
D
(q,S),{βD}] GC [Q
D
(q,S),{βD ,ΣD ,σC ,vC}]
...
Table 1. RREQ (From Source S to Destination T, Sequence Number q) Propagation in Ariadne
(left) and APALLS (right) over a path (A, B,C, D, . . .).
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A self-consistent node C, with an upstream node B is deemed consistent only if the per-hop
hash C claims to have received from B, viz, h(K−1CT [ν
B
C ]), matches what B claims to have
broadcast, viz., h(K−1BT [ν
A
B ], B). Verifying the consistency of C is possible only if B is found
to be self-consistent, or
MB = h(Q
A
(q,S), (B,ν
A
B ), h(K
−1
BT [ν
A
B ], B),KBT). (4)
Corresponding to every path through which the destination T receives an RREQ with no
inconsistencies, the destination invokes an RREP of type SUCC. For an RREQ received
through a path (A, B,W, G, H, P), the RREP is of the form
Pq = [(u,βS),{SUCC : (A, B,W, G, H, P)}] (5)
The RREP is authenticated to the source using a HMAC based on the secret KST . The value u
is a convenient index to the RREQ. That the RREP includes βS (the preimage of u) informs the
intermediate nodes that the destination did indeed invoke an RREP.
Some paths may contain one or more inconsistent nodes. As an example, consider a scenario
where an RREQ indicates a path (A, B,C, D, E, F), and the destination determines that while
D, E and F are consistent, C’s consistency cannot be verified because B was not self-consistent.
The RREP sent by T is then
Pq = [(u,βS),{FAIL : ((BλC), (D, E, F))}] (6)
The RREP is authenticated individually (using individual HMACs) for verification by the
consistent nodes D, E, F and the last self-consistent node C. The special code λ indicates that
an inconsistency was detected in the RREQ. Nodes that are identified as consistent (D, E and
F) consider this RREP as an instruction to drop subsequent RREQs from S to T if they include
C or B in the path (for example, if the source S sends a second RREQ after the first one times
out). This is also considered by nodes D and C as a request to store RREQs they had received
from their respective upstream nodes (C and B) in non volatile storage, for submission to the
TA at the earliest opportunity (for example, when the node has access to the Internet).
5. Rationale and security analysis
Some significant differences between Ariadne and APALLS are i) use of pairwise secrets
instead of TESLA; ii) mandating the RREQ source to append a digital signature; iii) enforcing
a PLN; iv) use of an additional upstream per-hop hash; and v) a digital signature appended
by every node broadcasting an RREQ, intended only for one-hop neighbors.
5.1 Choice of cryptographic authentication strategies
While Hu et al (Hu et al., 2005) preferred TESLA, Ariadne was also designed to support
pairwise secrets (Ariadne-PS) or digital signatures (Ariadne-DS) instead of TESLA. In
Ariadne-DS every intermediate node appends a digital signature (instead of an HMAC),
which is carried forward all the way till the destination. The obvious disadvantage of
using digital signatures is the overhead. This is exacerbated in Ariadne due to the fact
that signatures and public key certificates appended by every node in the RREQ path have
to be carried over all the way to the destination. Another disadvantage is the increased
susceptibility to trivial denial of service (DoS) attacks due to the high verification complexity.
An attacker can send random “signed packets” which can be recognized as bogus only after
the expensive verification process.
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When pairwise secrets are used the HMACs by intermediate nodes are computed as in
APALLS. End-points can also readily use a secret KST for authenticating RREQ/RREP instead
of relying on an out-of-network mechanism for establishing an application layer secret K¯ST .
No additional values need to be released during the reverse path; the destination can detect
both deletion and insertion attacks. Furthermore, issues related to the delay sensitivity of
TESLA based authentication (Sivakumar and Ramkumar, 2008) can also be avoided.
Another advantage of the fact that an out-of-network mechanism is not required to establish
pairwise secrets between end-points is that it opens up mechanisms for salvaging broken
routes, or re-routing RREPs. In a scenario where a node D in the path between S and T detects
that the path is broken, if D does not share readily a secret with S or T (in Ariadne-TESLA and
Ariadne-DS), it cannot raise an RREQ to S or T to find alternate paths. In Ariadne-PS, D can
do so.
The primary differences in rationale for the choice of key distribution strategies in Ariadne
and APALLS stem from the differences in the assumed network model.
5.1.1 Pairwise secrets instead of TESLA
The reason Hu et al (Hu et al., 2005) preferred TESLA over pairwise secrets was that
“broadcasting N commitments is easier than distributing (N2 ) secrets.” This is indeed true if a
trusted entity is available in every subnet to broadcast commitments. Broadcasting Ns = 200
(where Ns is the number of nodes in a specific subnet) TESLA commitments within a subnet is
indeed preferable to unicasting (Ns2 ) = 19,000 values (or unicasting 199 unique values to every
node).
However, keeping in mind that one of the most compelling advantages of MANET is the
ability to operate without infrastructural assistance (like a trusted entity in every subnet), for
large scale dynamic MANET networks (N(t) of the order of several millions) distributing
TESLA commitments can be more expensive. The only practical approach may be for each
node to possess a certified asymmetric key pair which is used for authenticating TESLA
commitments. In Ariadne, where the TESLA HMACs can be verified only by the destination,
an intermediate node X will need to release (during the RREP), a value from its TESLA chain,
and in addition, i) the TESLA commitment; ii) a digital signature of X for the commitment;
and iii) a certificate (issued by the TA) for the public key X.
5.1.2 RREQ signatures
In Ariadne the choice of the strategy for controlling RREQ floods is also based on the implicit
assumption that a trusted entity is available in every subnet. In the absence of such an
entity in each subnet, an attacker can collect sequence-number hash chain values made public
in one subnet to flood RREQs in other subnets. Thus, for the assumed network model,
sequence-number chains are not useful.
Furthermore, while the RREQ hash chain value provides implicit authentication to two fields
(source and sequence number), it does not protect other fields like the destination. Thus, if
an active attacker forwards the RREQ after changing the destination field, such an RREQ will
be propagated by downstream nodes. To authenticate all RREQ fields specified by the source
Hu et al suggested the use of chained one-time signature (OTS) schemes (Hu et al., 2003). In
chained OTS schemes, in a chain C0,C1, . . . CL the values (Ci,Ci+1) are keys pairs of an OTS
scheme which can be used to sign the RREQ. The signer can use Ci to compute a signature
which can be instantaneously verified by any node with access to Ci+1. The next RREQ from
the source will make Ci public and use Ci−1 to sign the message. This approach also relies on
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Fig. 1. Network Topology Used for Illustrations.
the same assumption (that the network is the subnet) as a value made public in one subnet
can be used in another subnet.
Mandating digital signatures by RREQ source can prevent such attacks. Furthermore, as
RREQs have to be authenticated, if a node S floods too many RREQs other nodes will simply
drop RREQs from S in the future.
5.2 Rationale for PLN
Perhaps the most important implication of the fact that inexpensive schemes for computing
pairwise secrets exist (MLS requires only one hash computation) is that it becomes practical
to enforce PLNs, and derive many tangible benefits out of this ability. More specifically,
enforcing the PLN is intended to achieve the following goals: i) eliminate trivial risk-free
active attacks; ii) validate the assumption behind the security of the per-hop hashing strategy;
iii) avoid one-way links and “links” created by semi-active attackers; iv) deter selfish behavior.
5.2.1 Trivial risk-free attacks
Consider a representative topology in Figure 1, for a specific scenario where a malicious node
C receives a RREQ originating from a node S (intended for the destination T) through the path
(A, B).
In Ariadne the shared network-wide secret KU does not prevent nodes from impersonating
other nodes for purposes of fooling their neighbors. For example, C, claiming to be “node
C′,” can relay the RREQ indicating a path (A, B,C′). All that D (which receives the packet
from “node C′”) can verify is that the C′ has access to the network-wide shared secret KU .
While paths that include C′ will be dropped by the source (in Ariadne-PS) or the destination
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(in Ariadne-TESLA), such RREQs can preempt good RREQs. Furthermore, C does not face
any risk of being identified.
Note that Ariadne-DS is not susceptible to such attacks as the signature appended by C can be
verified by its neighbors before the RREQ is forwarded. APALLS employs two independent
forms of link-layer authentication: one based on the one-hop PLN secret, and one based on
digital signatures. The PLN authentication also serves as a protection against DoS attacks that
could be launched due to the higher computational overhead required for verifying digital
signatures. RREQ packets relayed by a node C are first decrypted using PLN secret GC. Only
if the resulting packet is a valid8 RREQ packet will the receiver proceed to verify the signature
ΣC.
5.2.2 Protecting per hop hash
Many secure routing protocols (including Ariadne) simply assume bidirectional links. Often
the justification provided for this is that “the handshake used in colission avoidance protocols
ensures bidirectional links” (Kim & Tsudik., 2005). Unfortunately, this is not sufficient to
prevent a node C which can overhear packets sent by a node B from pretending that it cannot
(Sivakumar and Ramkumar, 2006).
When B relays a RREQ from S indicating a path (A, B) and a per-hop hash value βB, C can
wait for the RREQ to be relayed along another path, say (A, B, G, H). Now, with access to βB
(as C can hear B), C has the ability to remove its immediate upstream neighbor H (or G and
H) from the path. Imposing a PLN is necessary to validate the assumption behind the security
of the per-hop hashing technique - that nodes that are not neighbors cannot gain access to the
per-hop hash. If C pretends to be out of the range of B, B will not include C in its PLN (thus,
C will not gain access to the per-hop hash broadcast by B).
5.2.3 Semi active attacks
If a PLN is enforced a semi active attacker between B and C has to rebroadcast packets from
B and the response from C when they induct each other into their PLNs. B and C may have
reasons to suspect a semi active attacker when they hear an echo of their own transmissions,
or if an abnormally large delay is observed in handshakes between B and C (Hu et al., 2003).
Under such suspicions they will simply not induct the other node into their PLNs.
5.2.4 PLN as a deterrent
Without the ability to impose a PLN all that a node B can do to reduce the participation of a
bad neighbor C is to ignore packets from C. However, B cannot prevent C from forwarding
packets sent by B. The ability to cut-off neighbors in the physical neighborhood from the PLN
facilitates DoS-free countermeasures to reduce the ill-effects of malicious nodes. Nodes cut
off by all neighbors are effectively cut off from the subnet. Mandating a PLN can also deter
selfish selective participation. A node C will have to be inducted into the PLNs of its neighbors
before C can actually monitor traffic. Once inducted, C is pressured to participate self-lessly
due to the fact that it is under constant observation by its neighbors, who may cut C off if they
sense selfish participation.
8Valid RREQ packets may start with a magic number. In addition, for a packet from C, the last entry
in the path field should be C.
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5.3 Identifying and revoking active attackers
Enforcing a PLN does not address all risk-free attacks. As an illustration, consider a scenario
where C receives a RREQ (from S to T) along a path (A, B), and relays the RREQ indicating a
path (Q, R,C) instead, where Q and R are fictitious nodes inserted by C. Nodes downstream
of C have no reason to suspect that Q and R do not exist, and B does not have access to βS and
hence βQ = h(βS, Q) or βR = h(βQ, R) to verify that the value βC is indeed inconsistent.
Note that if C had instead advertised a path (A, R,C) with a random βC, B (which has access
to βA) can determine that βC = h(h(βA, R),C). Similarly, if C had modified any of the fields
specified by the “real” upstream nodes (A and B), then B can recognize such attempts. Thus,
while there are some blatant active attacks which can be easily be recognized by neighbors,
some subtler attacks can not.
Assume that the destination receives the tainted RREQ indicating a path (Q, R,C, D, E, F, G)
and a per-hop hash βG. Assume that the actual reason for the inconsistency in the RREQ
was that C had preformed an active attack. In Ariadne all that the destination can detect at
this point is that “the per-hop hash βG is inconsistent.” In Ariadne-DS and Ariadne-PS T can
also conclude with certainty that node G exists (as T can verify the HMAC / signature of
G). However, T cannot verify the authentication appended by F as T does not access to the
value βF (which had gone into the computation of the authentication appended by F). Thus
T cannot even determine if the node F actually exists in the path.
If T desires to determine who is responsible for perpetrating this attack, it can come to several
likely conclusions: like i) G is a malicious node and every other node in the path has been
maliciously inserted by G; or ii) G is a good node, but F may have maliciously inserted nodes
(A, B,C, D, E) in the path; or iii) both G and F are good nodes and the node E may have
inserted nodes (A, B,C, D) in the path; and so on.
In Ariadne-DS the destination can then demand all intermediate nodes (A, B,C, D, E, F, G)
to produce the per-hop hash they had received from their upstream neighbor, which is
simultaneously consistent with the signature of the upstream node (which was already
included in the RREQ sent to the destnation). Now node D can produce a value βC consistent
with the signature ΣC, and βD = h(βC, D) consistent with D’s signature ΣC. Likewise, all
nodes that had not violated the protocol can also do so.
However, the attacker C cannot produce a value βR consistent with the “signature ΣR.” The
obvious recourse for C is to not respond to this demand (C could just power off or leave the
subnet). Now, as it is not possible to compute the value βR (which according to C, was sent
by R) from βC = h(βR,C), one cannot deduce that ΣR is indeed inconsistent with βR. If C
has to be convicted based on its inability to provide an “affirmative defense” (providing βR
consistent with ΣR) it is indeed possible that an innocent D, which had suddenly crashed (and
thus loses the value βC) can also suffer the same fate.
5.3.1 Proof of active attacks in APALLS
The encrypted upstream per-hop hash ν in APALLS serves two purposes. Firstly, it makes
it possible for the destination to narrow down active attackers. For example, if in the path
(A, B,C, D, E, F, G) the destination is able to determine that nodes (D, E, F, G) were consistent,
and C, while self-consistent, cannot be verified to be consistent (as B is self-inconsistent), the
destination can narrow down the active attacker to B or C. Secondly, when used in conjunction
with one-hop signatures, it facilitates unambiguous identification of active attackers, and
avoids the need for nodes to provide affirmative defense.
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In other words, even without carrying over all signatures (thereby saving bandwidth
overhead for signatures and public-key certificates) APALLS can provide non repudiable
proof of active attacks. Irrespective of the nature of the active attack, a signed packet from
the attacker (stored temporarily by a neighbor, and submitted to the TA at a convenient time)
can be used for this purpose.
Note that the values broadcast by C is effectively a non repudiable statement to the effect “the
fields QBq,S, βB = K
−1
CT [ν
B
C ], and vB, were broadcast by B, and verified by me (C) to be consistent
with the signature of B (ΣB), the preimage of σB.”
When the values stored by D (the contents of the RREQ broadcast by C) are submitted to the
TA, the TA takes the following steps:
1. Verify that ΣC is consistent with Q
C
q,S, βC, σB and vB;
2. Check if B is a valid node in the network; if not, C is an active attacker (C had inserted a
nonexistent node in the path);
3. If B is a valid node, compute the signature ΣB
′ for the values QBq,S and βB = K
−1
CT [ν
B
C ] and
vB (which according to C, were broadcast by B), and
4. Verify if h(ΣS
′) = σB. If so, B is an active attacker (as B advertised self-inconsistent values
(B, MB,νB)). If not, C is the active attacker (as C had accepted a packet with an invalid
signature).
If the TA has access to the private keys of all nodes the TA can simply compute ΣB
′. If private
keys are not escrowed by the TA, the TA will need to request B to produce a verifiable signature
ΣS
′ for the values QBq,S and βB = KCT [ν
B
C ] and vB. Thus even in scenarios where the private
keys are not escrowed by the TA, unlike Ariadne-DS, nodes will only need access to their
private key to avoid being penalized (revoked9) accidentally.
A compelling advantage of escrowing private keys by the TA is that the verification of proof
of attacks can be performed immediately. This is especially useful in scenarios where access
to the TA is available (for example, if at least one node in the subnet has Internet access), as
the revocation message (signed by the TA) can be immediately distributed within the subnet.
5.4 Routing around attackers
In scenarios where access to the TA does not exist, nodes in the subnet will have to “live with”
active attackers for some (indefinite) duration. APALLS includes two strategies for improving
the ability to route around nodes suspected of active attacks. The first is by using black-lists
specified by the RREQ source. The second is by employing RREPs with a FAIL code.
The list of nodes in S’s black list can include nodes which were possibly S’s neighbor at some
time in the past, and observed by S to violate the protocol, or engage in selfish behavior.
The list can also include nodes which have been recognized as active attackers when S was a
destination node in some RREQ. That a node X is black-listed by a node S is not interpreted
by other nodes to mean that “X is malicious.” All this means is that the source S desires to
avoid X in paths where S is an end-point. Thus, the black-list of S will only influence routing
of RREQ packets in which S is the source or the destination.
The second strategy is intended to improve the success of the second RREQ that may be sent
by the source S after the first RREQ times out. For instance, in a scenario where the FAIL
RREP indicates [(BλC), (D, E, F, G), during the second RREQ the nodes (D, E, F, G) will drop
9Any node which claims to not have access to its private key should be revoked in any case.
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Fig. 2. Simulation results depicting the utility of the ability to narrow down the perpetrator.
RREQs that include C or B. Note that without this measure (and if the subnet topology has
not changed) the second RREQ may suffer the same fate as the first RREQ.
To evaluate the benefit of this strategy simulations were performed with random realization
of subnets with Ns = 200 nodes with uniformly distributed x and y coordinates in a square
region with unit edges. The range of the nodes was chosen as 0.1 units (each node had 5
neighbors on an average). Of the Ns = 200 nodes, b randomly chosen nodes were labeled
malicious. RREQ propagation was simulated between every pair of nodes.
Three different realizations of the network were simulated with different sets and numbers
of “bad” nodes. The simulation results are depicted as fraction of node-pairs that succeed
in discovering a path free of bad nodes (y-axis) vs the shortest number of hops between the
pair (between which RREQ propagation was simulated) as the x-axis. RREQ propagation
was simulated for over 400,000 pairs separated by hop lengths between 4 and 10. Path
discovery between a pair is assumed to succeed if at least one of the established paths is
free of b malicious nodes. In Figure 2 plots labelled S1 depict the success rates of first RREQs.
Simulation results are shown for b = 15 (S1-15) and b = 30 (S1-30).
The plots labelled S2 indicate fraction of successful node pairs after the second RREQ (either
the first or the second RREQ attempt succeeds). As can be seen from the simulation results the
success rate after the second RREQ for the scenario with 30 bad nodes (S2-30) is comparable
to the success of the first RREQ with just 15 bad nodes (S1-15). It is important to note that in
the absence of this strategy, the second RREQ has only as much chance of succeeding as the
first. Thus, in this particular instance, it can be argued that the additional upstream per-hop
hash helps in realizing a two-fold improvement in resistance to malicious nodes in the subnet.
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5.5 RREP authentication
In Ariadne the authentication appended by the destination for the RREP (which is verifiable
only by the RREQ source) is indistinguishable from a random number for all intermediate
nodes that relay the RREP. This can be exploited by attackers to send spurious RREPs over
long (fictitious) paths to cause unnecessary bandwidth overhead for other nodes in the subnet.
Nodes specified in the path will simply forward the RREP along the path specified. This attack
is particularly dangerous in Ariadne as every intermediate node will need to release a TESLA
key and a certificate for a commitment.
Consider a scenario where an RREQ from a source S to some destination T indicates ti (as
the upper limit before which the destination T should receive the RREQ). Assume that such
an RREQ through a path (K, L, M) is heard by an attacker W. Just by overhearing any RREP
packet in response to any RREQ (not necessarily a response for the RREQ from S) after time
ti, it is possible for the attacker W to harvest a preimage K
i
X corresponding to time ti of some
node X. The node X may even be many hops away from W. A malicious W can now send
a fictitious RREP indicating a path (K, L, M, X) to M with a random HMAC by “destination
T”. All that nodes (K, L, M) can verify is that KiX is indeed i
thpre-image of K0X . Obviously
this serves very little purpose without the ability to recognize the authentication appended by
the RREP destination (which conveys the crucial information that the HMACs were received
before time ti). Effectively, any node can send such spurious RREP packets in response to any
RREQ packet, impersonating some other node which may be several hops away.
In APALLS the destination includes a value βS in the RREP which was until then known only
to the source and destination. Thus, even while supercilious RREPs can be sent by nodes
(which will be detected by the source as inconsistent), such RREPs can be raised only by
nodes which had actually seen an RREP from the destination. Furthermore, such an attack is
not worthwhile for any attacker as the RREP overhead is small in any case in APALLS.
6. Related work and conclusions
Several authors have investigated strategies for securing DSR, and mechanisms for
cryptographic authentication.
6.1 Other secure DSR protocols
Papadimitros (Papadimitratos and Haas., 2002) et al propose a secure routing protocol (SRP)
where only the source and destination share a secret. Marshall et al (Marshall et .al,
2003) argued that SRP cannot avoid malicious behavior by intermediate nodes during the
route establishment phase, as long as the (malicious) behavior is consistent in the forward
and reverse path. They also suggest techniques to mitigate issues in SRP by employing
promiscuous mode of operation (Marti et al., 2000).
Kim et al (Kim & Tsudik., 2005) (SRDP) propose a general protocol for securing route
discovery in DSR, where the primary deviation from Ariadne is that they strive to reduce
the bandwidth overheads by aggregating the authentication appended by intermediate nodes
(for Ariadne-PS and Ariadne-DS where the destination can verify authentication appended by
intermediate nodes). The disadvantage of aggregating authentication is that the destination
cannot verify which node was responsible for the inconsistency. As Ariadne does not strive
to do that in any case, aggregating authentication can reduce RREQ overhead for Ariadne.
However, aggregating HMACs can not be done for APALLS as it would not permit detection
of self-consistency of nodes.
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APALLS is an extension of an earlier work (also by the authors of this chapter) (Sivakumar and
Ramkumar, 2008) which sought to improve the resiliency of Ariadne-PS. The improvements
suggested in (Sivakumar and Ramkumar, 2008) include i) use of the upstream per-hop hash
to narrow down active attackers; and ii) enforcing a PLN. The modifications in APALLS
compared to (Sivakumar and Ramkumar, 2008) are: i) the use of one-hop digital signatures
for non-repudiation; ii) mandating digital signature by the RREQ source; and iii) a modified
strategy for authenticating RREPs.
6.2 Key distribution
Several key distribution schemes have been proposed in the literature for ad hoc networks.
Zhou et al (Zhou and Haas., 1999) propose a key management service with distributed
CA, using threshold cryptography to distribute shares of the CAs private key to several
nodes. Capkun et al (Capkun and Hubaux., 2003) propose a strategy for “building secure
routing from an incomplete set of security associations” (BISS), in which a combination of
predistribution of keys (which facilitates only an incomplete set of pairwise secrets) and public
key primitives are used. The motivation for BISS seems to be that schemes for establishing
pairwise secrets between a fraction of nodes is more practical than schemes that permit every
pair nodes to establish a secret.
Zhang et al (Zhang et al., 2005) propose the use of identity based encryption an signature (IBE
/ IBS) schemes for ad hoc networks. IBS schemes can reduce the bandwidth overhead for
signatures as i) public keys and public key certificates are not required; and ii) the signatures
are also generally smaller than (say) RSA signatures. This advantage is not compelling in
APALLS as signatures are not carried forward. Unlike RSA signatures where we can reduce
signature verification complexity by choosing small public exponents, IBS schemes do not
have practical strategies to reduce verification complexity. High verification complexity can
lead to simple DoS attacks. However, in APALLS, this is not a disadvantage as the low
complexity PLN-based authentication (which is verified before signatures are verified) can
prevent such DoS attacks. Thus, both the advantages and disadvantages of IBS schemes are
less relevant in APALLS.
6.3 Conclusions
We have outlined a comprehensive secure routing protocol, APALLS, based on DSR. To the
extent of our knowledge, APALLS is the first secure routing protocol which is designed to
provide non repudiable proof of active attacks.
Non-repudiable authentication is necessary, but not sufficient to provide non repudiable proof
of active attacks. In general, any active attack involves violation of the prescribed protocol.
The protocol prescribes the steps that a node (say) C should take in response to a packet
sent from a neighbor (say) B. For example, in distance vector based protocols, if a node B
announces a hop-length of 5 to a node S, the neighbor C downstream of B is expected to
announce a hop-length 6.
In a scenario where C advertises a hop-length 7, proving that C did (or did not) violate the
protocol requires several contextual information like (for example) i) if B was indeed a neighbor
of C at that time; ii) the hop count advertised by B at that time ; iii) if C did indeed process the
information advertised by B (the packet broadcast by B did not suffer colission), etc.. Thus,
even while some ad hoc routing protocols like ARAN (Sanzgiri et al., 2002) and Ariadne-DS
employ non repudiable authentication, they do not address the issue of how a packet sent
from a node can be used for proving an active attack. As pointed out in this chapter, even
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while Ariadne-DS carries forward all signatures, it still has practical issues in providing non
repudiable proof.
One of the motivations for APALLS stem from the fact that the main advantage of MANET
based networks is their ability to operate without any infrastructural support. Ideally, while
we would desire to eliminate even an off-line TA, this is simply not possible to do so as an
authority is required to i) specify the rules (the protocol) that should be followed by every
node; and ii) to boot-strap cryptographic associations between nodes.
While APALLS borrows some features from Ariadne, the major differences between Ariadne
and APALLS stem from the network model. Several elements in Ariadne like i) the preference
of TESLA over pairwise secrets; ii) the choice of the strategy to suppress RREQ floods; and iii)
ignoring the risk of supercilious RREPs (RREP bandwidth can be high if a TA is not available
in the subnet) assume the presence of a TA in every subnet. While APALLS can take advantage
of access to TA (when at least one node in the subnet has access to the Internet) for quickly
disseminating revocation lists, APALLS can operate effectively even in subnets that may be
completely isolated from the rest of the world.
The choice of cryptographic authentication schemes in APALLS are also driven by the need
to keep the overhead low. Storage is an inexpensive resource for mobile devices; any
mobile device can easily afford several GBs of pluggable storage. However computational
and bandwidth overheads are expensive for battery operated devices. This renders
key predistribution schemes for pairwise secrets (which impose low computational and
bandwidth overhead) well suited even for dynamic large scale networks.
That digital signatures appended by intermediate nodes are verified only by neighbors
renders just about any scheme well suited for this purpose. More specifically, it also opens
up the feasibility of non repudiable one-time signature (OTS) schemes10 which do not require
asymmetric primitives. That only neighbors need to verify the signature renders the scheme
proposed by Merkle et al (Merkle, 1987) for constructing infinite OTS trees substantially more
efficient. That OTS schemes require only block-cipher/ hash operations implies that even
very low complexity SIM cards can perform the operations required for this purpose. Such
low complexity SIM cards which need to perform only symmetric cipher operations can be
realized at lower cost.
Some of the ongoing work of the authors include i) investigation of the suitability of OTS
schemes; and ii) use of one-hop signatures for providing non repudiable proof of active attacks
for other MANET routing protocols like AODV (Perkins et al., 2002), TORA (Park and Corson,
1997) and OLSR (Jacquet, 2001).
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8. Appendix
8.1 A scalable key predistribution scheme
Unlike MLS, scalable KPSs are susceptible to collusions. For an (n, p)-secure KPS, an attacker
with access to secrets of n nodes can compute a fraction p of all possible pairwise secrets.
As long as p is low enough (say 2−64) it is computationally infeasible for an attacker to even
identity which pairwise secrets can be compromised by using the pool of secrets accumulated
from n nodes.
8.2 A scalable key predistribution scheme
In the subset keys and identity tickets (SKIT) scheme (Ramkumar, 2009) defined two
parameters m and M, the KDC chooses mM secrets, say, Ki,j,1 ≤ i ≤ m,1 ≤ j ≤ M (which
can be derived from a single master secret µ as Ki,j = h(µ, i, j)).
The KDC chooses a public pseudo random function (PRF) f () which generates a m log2 M
pseudo-random bits. For a node with identity A the output of the PRF f (A) is interpreted
as m log2 M-bits values, ai,1 ≤ i ≤ m,0 ≤ ai ≤ M − 1∀i. Corresponding to the m indices, A is
issued m secrets Ki,ai ,1 ≤ i ≤ m. Node A is also issued mM identity tickets Ii,j = h(Ki,j, A),1 ≤
i ≤ m,1≤ j ≤ M. Identity tickets are conceptually similar to HMACs; however, while HMACs
are not intended to be secrets, identity tickets provided to A are intended only for A.
Two nodes A and B can compute 2m common tickets. Computing any pairwise secret (say
when A requires to compute KAB) will require generating m log2 M pseudo random bits to
determine the indices of the m secrets assigned to B, followed by computation of m hashes.
Every node requires storage for mM certificates.
An attacker with access to secrets of n nodes O1 · · ·On can compute KAB if the m secrets of
each of the n nodes include Ki,ai ,1≤ i ≤ m and Ki,bi ,1≤ i ≤ m. The probability of such an event
is
p(n) ≈ (1− e−n/M)2m. (7)
For m = 32 and M = 216, p(45,000)< 2−64, and p(84400)≈ 2−30. For m = 32 and M = 216 × 5,
p(225,000) < 2−64, and p(422,000) ≈ 2−30.
If each node can afford 100 MB storage we can choose m = 32 and M = 216 × 5 to realize a
scheme for which p(225,000) ≈ 2−64 and p(422,000) ≈ 2−30. Only the storage complexity is
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increased. The computational overhead, which is influenced by the value m = 32 remains the
same. Due to the low computational overheads, the computations can be easily performed
inside the modest SIM cards to further alleviate the issue of exposure of secrets from a large
number of nodes. An attacker desiring the exploit the collusion susceptibility of SKIT will
have to successfully tamper with and expose secrets from several hundred thousand SIM
cards.
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